|
Here we can inject a reference to the eonic model, as this formalizes in
an elegant, and ultimately very simple, way the basic facts of the eonic effect,
as a series of three (or more ) transitions in a mainline called the eonic
sequence. The model arises from a clear examination of the Axial Age and the
requirements for an adequate analysis of its enigma. The resolution lies in the
formulation of the idea of an eonic sequence, whose set of transitions, or
accelerations, demands two levels of analysis. We derive the model from an
interesting question: when did evolution stop and history begin? The answer to
this paradox is that no instantaneous transition would be possible, instead
nature would demand a Transition between the two. We can apply the same logic to
that Transition: would one such transition do the job? No, in fact we see the
form of the Transition would be a series of such transitions in a series in
which the balance of evolutionary and history aspects would shift their mix.
Most remarkably that is what we see in the eonic effect, and the result is a
model on two levels, the macro and the micro. The macro shows 'high level'
determination, and the micro is the realization aspect in its wake. This gives
us a rough model of the Axial, and other, 'axial', transitions.
This analysis on two levels resolves at a stroke the confusions of the Axial
period: we see the macro effect in the sudden eruption of effects, the micro
aspect in the actual way each transitional area undergoes realization in a
differentiated spectrum. The hopeless muddle of the Old Testament clarifies,
since we can see the braided macro and micro effects. The Axial component, as
pure timing, indicates the macro, the actual form of the Old Testament myth
representing the micro. That the Old Testament is a micro description of a macro
process its observers did not properly understand at once clarifies the
historical result we see.
In general the clearest picture of the process is to be had from its best
documented instance, the Archaic/Classical phase of the Greek Axial interval,
surely the most spectacular moment of civilizational acceleration given to us by
historiography and archaeology. The diversity of the whole Axial spectrum
requires emphasis. Two religions are born, in Israel, and India, a whole series
of philosophical, political, artistic, and other innovations, appear as if like
clockwork, and then the process subsides and goes into steady state, more or
less. Our next realization is that the clue to the whole has fallen into our lap
and we extend this analysis, using the discrete-continuous interpretation, to a
plain vanilla cyclical analysis based on a sequence of transitions: the birth of
civilization (actually the point of the emergence of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt),
the Axial interval as such, and the suddenly emergent modernity we see as the
modern transition. The idea of a model can allow us to realize, and get use to,
such an outlandish, at first, form of analysis, by formalizing on a 'take it or
leave it' basis: that is, we can simply try this approach as formal modeling,
until such time as its basic rightness begins to sink in.
A considerable list of accessory concepts is required here, and we might note
two: the idea of a frontier effect, and the idea of relative transforms, or the
'stream and sequence' concept. Our eonic sequence follows a simple logic: that
of globalization, eonic globalization, and we see that our eonic sequence at
each stage is moving to a new frontier zone of realization, in the oikoumene
field of its prior manifestation. This resolves the puzzle of the sudden
'restart' in a minor Canaanite area on the boundaries of the Sumerian/Egyptian
fields. This effect is essential for understanding the rise of modernity with
its European polarization, and vulnerability to Eurocentric confusions, which
are destined to be transient side effects of the larger eonic sequence, which
proceeds independently of the individual civilizations it touches. The question
of relative transforms is essential logic needed to grasp the way in which two
levels operate in tandem. We see that the Axial interval seems to generate, e.g.
monotheism, while at one and the same time 'monotheism' existed, or was
developing, prior to the Axial interval This non-puzzle is instantly
clarified by a version of a discrete-continuous model, in which we take the
'stream' of culture, or cultures, on one level, and the overlaid 'sequence'
effect of the larger macro process together as two aspects of a master system.
The rough elegance of this systematic braiding of the evolutionary and the
historical is first seen in its prodigious glory in the earlier, especially
Axial, periods, and gives a new perspective on the rise of the modern: it is a
transition in a series, follows the logic of frontier effects, and shows one and
the same 'stream and sequence' overlay found in the other cases. This macro and
micro aspect of the modern transition, with the consequent devolution to micro
in the wake of the Great Divide, followed by the phase of globalization, allows
us to see together the confusion of liberal and post-liberal systems that we
have discussed from the start. It is very disconcerting to Eurocentric fans of
the modern transition to watch this globalization of their transient
localization start its prodigious globalization, almost like clockwork, in the
wake of the eonic sequence. The timely appearance of the types such as Karl Marx
is thus seen for what it is. Their ambivalence toward the basic liberal
emergentism is suddenly understandable, and yet ominous in its potential for
deviation from the suddenly crystallized version of the
mainline.
The relationship of localization, as a set of transitions in the eonic
sequence, and their contribution and subsequent globalization in a set of
oikoumenes or diffusion fields, and globalization, is the most confusing aspect
of the eonic effect (the modern transition is not a question of Europe!), and
yet once mapped out the process is remarkably simple. And in that context we can
come to an understanding of the emergent left of the nineteenth century. It is
almost uncanny to see how a remorphing of liberalism, a prime emergent process
of the modern transition, moves to respond to the process of economic
globalization. Nothing in our eonic model says anything about what occurs
outside of its mainline. Thus the moment of the divide, the termination of the
eonic action, is open to deviation and chaotification, and the substitution of
quite different processes for the general direction set by the eonic interval.
This issue particularly clarifies the ambiguity of the globalization era of the
modern post-transition, at once an active diffusionism of modernist elements,
and a protest against Eurocentrism and imperialistic economism. The timely
appearance of an agency of globalization, visible in the Marxist response to
modernity and globalizing economism, is almost miraculous and the undoubted
reason for the mystique of the left, whatever the confusions of its ideological
crystallization.
But eonic analysis pushes us at once to compensate for the inadequacies of
Marxist thinking. We should extend our analysis to the broadest categories, e.g.
an idea of the 'eonic left', or the transformational character of the whole
eonic series, beginning with the emergence of civilizations and states and the
dramas and spectacles of equalization visible in the action of the eonic effect.
Here the basic emphasis of the left shows its eonic character, but one shifted
to the phase of globalization, hence with a sudden potential for direct
opposition to the very transition that has generated the whole new era.
We have the clue to the spastic dialectic of the nineteenth century left. It
is picture perfect in one way, and completely disorganized in another. It
appears promptly to ride the wave of globalization, equalization, and de-Eurocentricization,
as a 'helper' process in the degenerations of the post-transition. What might
help (we hardly dare to pontificate) is a broader sense of the historical
context of civilizations, diffusion fields, globalization(s), and religions,
along with a closer look at the emergent character of the democratic revolution.
Such a left could be at once a fulfilment and a critique of 'bourgeois
modernity', and be aware of its limits in the difficult effort to restage 'modernities'
in the diffusion field arising after the Great Divide. Otherwise we should feel
condemned to the sudden deviations from the general character of the modern
transition, rather than to the fulfilment of its basic action. .
These remarks are very general. But they show the context of the
paradox of the democratic revolution spawning its own antagonist so swiftly in
the wake of the modern transition, and the need to thoroughly grasp the
concealed eonic character of the modern democratic wave, thus correcting the too
frequent blindness of the left to the nature of its own task, so perfectly in
place, yet frittered away in confused theoretical formations unnecessary to that
basic task.
Most of all our model is a reminder of the treacherous nature of teleological
thinking. Our model gives us a handle on teleological thinking applied to
history, even as it severely disciplines any such thinking with a reminder that
teleological ideologies are not going to get it straight. The directionality
seen in the eonic sequence gives a gift of insight into teleology even as it
confiscates such a notion to a higher level, one that political movements in
time cannot control. Their task is the realization of the basic tasks of the
moment: the eonic emergentism set by the arising processes appearing in the wake
of the transition's divide.
|
|