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  1.5 An Eonic Model

Last modified 06/08/2008

  Here we can inject a reference to the eonic model, as this formalizes in an elegant, and ultimately very simple, way the basic facts of the eonic effect, as a series of three (or more ) transitions in a mainline called the eonic sequence. The model arises from a clear examination of the Axial Age and the requirements for an adequate analysis of its enigma. The resolution lies in the formulation of the idea of an eonic sequence, whose set of transitions, or accelerations, demands two levels of analysis. We derive the model from an interesting question: when did evolution stop and history begin? The answer to this paradox is that no instantaneous transition would be possible, instead nature would demand a Transition between the two. We can apply the same logic to that Transition: would one such transition do the job? No, in fact we see the form of the Transition would be a series of such transitions in a series in which the balance of evolutionary and history aspects would shift their mix. Most remarkably that is what we see in the eonic effect, and the result is a model on two levels, the macro and the micro. The macro shows 'high level' determination, and the micro is the realization aspect in its wake. This gives us a rough model of the Axial, and other, 'axial', transitions. 

This analysis on two levels resolves at a stroke the confusions of the Axial period: we see the macro effect in the sudden eruption of effects, the micro aspect in the actual way each transitional area undergoes realization in a differentiated spectrum. The hopeless muddle of the Old Testament clarifies, since we can see the braided macro and micro effects. The Axial component, as pure timing, indicates the macro, the actual form of the Old Testament myth representing the micro. That the Old Testament is a micro description of a macro process its observers did not properly understand at once clarifies the historical result we see. 

In general the clearest picture of the process is to be had from its best documented instance, the Archaic/Classical phase of the Greek Axial interval, surely the most spectacular moment of civilizational acceleration given to us by historiography and archaeology. The diversity of the whole Axial spectrum requires emphasis. Two religions are born, in Israel, and India, a whole series of philosophical, political, artistic, and other innovations, appear as if like clockwork, and then the process subsides and goes into steady state, more or less. Our next realization is that the clue to the whole has fallen into our lap and we extend this analysis, using the discrete-continuous interpretation, to a plain vanilla cyclical analysis based on a sequence of transitions: the birth of civilization (actually the point of the emergence of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt), the Axial interval as such, and the suddenly emergent modernity we see as the modern transition. The idea of a model can allow us to realize, and get use to, such an outlandish, at first, form of analysis, by formalizing on a 'take it or leave it' basis: that is, we can simply try this approach as formal modeling, until such time as its basic rightness begins to sink in. 

A considerable list of accessory concepts is required here, and we might note two: the idea of a frontier effect, and the idea of relative transforms, or the 'stream and sequence' concept. Our eonic sequence follows a simple logic: that of globalization, eonic globalization, and we see that our eonic sequence at each stage is moving to a new frontier zone of realization, in the oikoumene field of its prior manifestation. This resolves the puzzle of the sudden 'restart' in a minor Canaanite area on the boundaries of the Sumerian/Egyptian fields. This effect is essential for understanding the rise of modernity with its European polarization, and vulnerability to Eurocentric confusions, which are destined to be transient side effects of the larger eonic sequence, which proceeds independently of the individual civilizations it touches. The question of relative transforms is essential logic needed to grasp the way in which two levels operate in tandem. We see that the Axial interval seems to generate, e.g. monotheism, while at one and the same time 'monotheism' existed, or was developing, prior to the Axial interval  This non-puzzle is instantly clarified by a version of a discrete-continuous model, in which we take the 'stream' of culture, or cultures, on one level, and the overlaid 'sequence' effect of the larger macro process together as two aspects of a master system. The rough elegance of this systematic braiding of the evolutionary and the historical is first seen in its prodigious glory in the earlier, especially Axial, periods, and gives a new perspective on the rise of the modern: it is a transition in a series, follows the logic of frontier effects, and shows one and the same 'stream and sequence' overlay found in the other cases. This macro and micro aspect of the modern transition, with the consequent devolution to micro in the wake of the Great Divide, followed by the phase of globalization, allows us to see together the confusion of liberal and post-liberal systems that we have discussed from the start. It is very disconcerting to Eurocentric fans of the modern transition to watch this globalization of their transient localization start its prodigious globalization, almost like clockwork, in the wake of the eonic sequence. The timely appearance of the types such as Karl Marx is thus seen for what it is. Their ambivalence toward the basic liberal emergentism is suddenly understandable, and yet ominous in its potential for deviation from the suddenly crystallized version of the mainline.   

The relationship of localization, as a set of transitions in the eonic sequence, and their contribution and subsequent globalization in a set of oikoumenes or diffusion fields, and globalization, is the most confusing aspect of the eonic effect (the modern transition is not a question of Europe!), and yet once mapped out the process is remarkably simple. And in that context we can come to an understanding of the emergent left of the nineteenth century. It is almost uncanny to see how a remorphing of liberalism, a prime emergent process of the modern transition, moves to respond to the process of economic globalization. Nothing in our eonic model says anything about what occurs outside of its mainline. Thus the moment of the divide, the termination of the eonic action, is open to deviation and chaotification, and the substitution of quite different processes for the general direction set by the eonic interval. This issue particularly clarifies the ambiguity of the globalization era of the modern post-transition, at once an active diffusionism of modernist elements, and a  protest against Eurocentrism and imperialistic economism. The timely appearance of an agency of globalization, visible in the Marxist response to modernity and globalizing economism, is almost miraculous and the undoubted reason for the mystique of the left, whatever the confusions of its ideological crystallization. 

But eonic analysis pushes us at once to compensate for the inadequacies of Marxist thinking. We should extend our analysis to the broadest categories, e.g. an idea of the 'eonic left', or the transformational character of the whole eonic series, beginning with the emergence of civilizations and states and the dramas and spectacles of equalization visible in the action of the eonic effect. Here the basic emphasis of the left shows its eonic character, but one shifted to the phase of globalization, hence with a sudden potential for direct opposition to the very transition that has generated the whole new era. 

We have the clue to the spastic dialectic of the nineteenth century left. It is picture perfect in one way, and completely disorganized in another. It appears promptly to ride the wave of globalization, equalization, and de-Eurocentricization, as a 'helper' process in the degenerations of the post-transition. What might help (we hardly dare to pontificate) is a broader sense of the historical context of civilizations, diffusion fields, globalization(s), and religions, along with a closer look at the emergent character of the democratic revolution. Such a left could be at once a fulfilment and a critique of 'bourgeois modernity', and be aware of its limits in the difficult effort to restage 'modernities' in the diffusion field arising after the Great Divide. Otherwise we should feel condemned to the sudden deviations from the general character of the modern transition, rather than to the fulfilment of its basic action. . 

 These remarks are very general. But they show the context of the paradox of the democratic revolution spawning its own antagonist so swiftly in the wake of the modern transition, and the need to thoroughly grasp the concealed eonic character of the modern democratic wave, thus correcting the too frequent blindness of the left to the nature of its own task, so perfectly in place, yet frittered away in confused theoretical formations unnecessary to that basic task. 

Most of all our model is a reminder of the treacherous nature of teleological thinking. Our model gives us a handle on teleological thinking applied to history, even as it severely disciplines any such thinking with a reminder that teleological ideologies are not going to get it straight. The directionality seen in the eonic sequence gives a gift of insight into teleology even as it confiscates such a notion to a higher level, one that political movements in time cannot control. Their task is the realization of the basic tasks of the moment: the eonic emergentism set by the arising processes appearing in the wake of the transition's divide. 

 

 

  

 


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