3.2 A Liberal World
Last modified 06/08/2008
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Our analysis has shown the eonic roots of the liberal emergentist world
that arises with such momentum in the nineteenth century. We have produced
without trying something leftists scorn, a theoretical legitimation of a
political system in terms of an argument of historical dynamics. But, since we
did it without trying, there might be something to it, and at least the result
might be free of some bias for being a side effect of an analysis that began
with the Pharaohs and passed through the multiple universes of the Axial Age.
Our eonic sequence produces a series of self-enclosed worlds, and the liberal
nexus seems to be another of them. Relative to the ages past, it can, and
should, be seen as an immense achievement, and proof of some evolutionary claim of
progress.
That a group of leftist hotheads saw fit to bicker over the result almost before it came into existence shows perhaps the justice in dialectics, and the claim one must grant that the eonic sequence having produced one world is potentially the source of an infinity of others. But at least we should consider that the replication of the action of the eonic sequence is a task not likely to succeed with eclectic innovations of theory. We see a world whose elements require thorough mastery and that in the larger context of world history as a whole. Our eonic model is thus completely open to multiple perspectives on such questions and even opens a folder called 'TP4 exceptions', or the analysis, which the reader can pursue in the text of World History And The Eonic Effect, of general mideonic start up formations, whether these fulfill or deviate in our estimation from the eonic sequence. This involves among other tasks the study of the great religions and also the consideration, so deftly muzzled in the propaganda of that Hegelian rascal Fukuyama, of the, yes, Zoroastrian thunders latent in our eonic analysis. The beginnings we see in the eonic effect demand, if only by a process of logical inevitability, the query, woefully metaphysical, about the 'ends of things', thence the ministrations of mad prophets as to the 'end times'. To unsettle our quaintly foundationalist analysis of a liberal world with the pronunciamentoes of the once and future Zarathustras is proper suspense in a tale left unfinished, but perhaps Fukuyama had a point. We can see that in a discrete-continuous system that outcomes tend to stabilize and endure, save only that that stabilization at its initial point could be flawed from the start, inducing the obsession to redo the beginnings that we see in the Marxist Zarathustras. We have to leave it there for the moment, having granted ample latitude for both, or many, perspectives, having achieved what any Marxist needs to have achieved, a basic clarification of liberalism in action, a gesture certainly present, most unclearly, in the famous manifesto of Marx. We should note in passing the structural resemblance of the left of the left to the situation spawned in the wake of the Axial Age, wherein the parallel emergentism of the Judaic and Greco-Roman transitions induced a collision of the two and a highly ambiguous 'revolution against Rome' resulting in a theocratic statism of equivocal status. Anyone in the leftist catacomb would do well to ponder this outcome in all possible aspects, humble to the finitude of human aspiration dressed up in Zoroastrian finery confronted with the probable outcomes in frozen medievalism.
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