3.3 The Great Divide
Last modified 04/23/2008
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Seen in light of the eonic model, the little considered property of the
Axial period is its brevity, its action in a finite interval, as a kind of
interruption against the stream of world history. The eonic model is designed to
reflect this property, and armed with its insights we discover, to our surprise,
the same property reflected in the rise of the modern: the distinction between
the action that generates a new age in world history and the realization period
that follows. In fact we can clock the rise of the modern on this basis, to
discover the rough point at which the finite interval of the 'second Axial Age'
is complete. The period 1500 to 1800, for reasons that become clearer if we
examine the eonic sequence at length, constitutes the period of transformation,
and its conclusion therefore would be visible already by the nineteenth century.
We call this the Great Divide, and we can see that the immense passage from the
Protestant Reformation to the Enlightenment constitutes a kind of unit that
immediately issues forth in an era of realization, filled with dramatic changes,
but still reflecting its basic assumptions or framework generated in the
interval of transition.
The point here for us is to see that the rise of modernity closely mirrors the Axial phenomenon, and yet is completely different. It is the interval of transition that is decisive, and any effort to propose a 'second Axial Age' after that interval, a frequently occurring notion in much discussion of Jaspers' idea, is going to miss the point. Just as the Greek and Israelite transitions set the tone for what was to come, so the modern transition simply doesn't support the hopes for the creation of a new religion, or, indeed, the restoration via retrograde traditionalism of the outstanding products of the Axial period. A great deal of confusion has arisen here, but the eonic model clearly warns of the danger of trying to perpetuate the past in the name of a 'second Axial Age'. This does not mean that the often shallow viewpoint of the secularist is the last word on the subject of religion. Only that the elements for a new 'religion' will, to a high probability, be forced to use the emergent elements of the modern transition if they are to match the momentum of the classical period. That's an enigma in itself, and yet a careful examination of German classical philosophy shows how deftly the problem is solved at a stroke in outcomes that are still little appreciated in those who propose a narrow secularism. As we have noted the philosopher Kant essentially sounds the correct note by juxtaposing so dramatically the issue of causal science, and the basis for ethical freedom in man as a species being. A great deal needs to be said here, but we should note the ironic way that the Protestant Reformation outstrips itself, leaving beyond 'religion' to 'religion', in the context of human reason, and gives birth to its continuation and completion, witness the Enlightenment upgrade to religion in the considerations flowering so briefly in the seminal insights of the figure of Kant. The mystery is that the only sound basis for a 'true' religion is the idea of freedom, and this, in its universe of potential meanings, appears explosively in the modern transition, and especially in the era of the Great Divide.
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