1.2 Natural Selection: The Basic Confusion
Last modified 07/04/2008
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Huxley was the principal champion of Darwin's theory, but it is a
testament to how we have forgotten the moment of the onset of Darwinism if we
recall his warning to Darwin on the eve of the publication of Origin of
possible problems with the theory of natural selection. And we should note that
Wallace, who actually anticipated Darwin, later came to see the difficulty with
selectionist explanation applied to the descent of man. There was always
something excessive in the claims made for natural selection, which is, we
should note, an anthropomorphic term taken from the realm of animal breeders,
and one then routinely applied to make claims for evolutionary reduction that
can only be called 'metaphysical'. There is hardly a mystery here, quite apart
from the difficult question of actually proving by demonstration the actual
incidents of natural selection doing what is claimed, if we consider what
Darwinists did, and still do, claim as part of the achievement of this theory.
Almost any aspect of the organism, sight unseen, is ascribed in advance to the
work of natural selection (in association with random mutation, in the version
that arose after the beginnings of modern genetics) and its associated routine
of finding an adaptationist scenario for each trait or organismic feature so
annexed to the selectionist framework. But here we see at once that this is
tantamount to having claimed to solve all the problems of metaphysics, and we
should flag a question mark at once. Thus, firstly, the question of demonstration arises and there we are confronted by a rapidly expanding vista called 'deep time' where our observations are thin indeed, and where, as always, the increasing evidentiary plausibility of evolution as a fact is not matched by the corresponding evidences of natural selection as the explanation. A higher standard of evidence is required for the latter, and this can't be had by 'science tourism', gazing at deep time in wonder at the spectacle of evolutionary sequences. And, secondly, in and of itself, the claims for natural selection are clearly made by those whose commitment to scientism expresses a prejudice against philosophy and a cocky attitude that a framework of utmost simplicity, despite evidentiary lacunae, should at a stroke explain the utmost complexity. We have a right to take up the mantle of the philosopher for a moment, and wonder if this is science or metaphysical delusion. Let us grant the issue of divinity for a moment, on the grounds that Darwin, at least, did not make 'instant atheism' a quick lemma of his evolutionary 'theorems', but note that the 'design' question he quite obviously thought refuted still lingers in his own language, selection, along with the clear confusion over the analog of a designer in the comparison of the breeder and the faceless statistics of nature. 'Natural selection' clearly occurs, but it seems to be a name for what we haven't observed, as yet, and is thus a loan against future research. In every generation 'nature' 'selects' a new generation of organisms, but how does it do this? By natural selection! But how does this natural selection work? Note how we have used the term of reference to the explanation for the explanation itself. |
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