We have completed our brief survey of the problems with Darwinism, in the process showing how a new approach to evolution, for man at least, can resolve the paradoxes and limits shown in Darwin's mono-level theory of natural selection. And now we can indicate more indirectly how the issues of metaphysics doomed Darwin's approach. The issue of divinity is more or less sidelined by Darwin, but we can see in the debates between atheists and proponents of design, both claming their approaches to evolution, that despite Darwin's relatively agnostic view, the issue of theism has invaded the discourse in the standard dialectical seesaw that we see. As to 'soul' we simply have no empirical observations of what we can safely call the totality of the 'organism' and the Kantian warning about, not only our representations of objects, but our representations of our own selves, leaves us at the limits of self-observation, unable to find conclusive self-knowledge that would determine a clear answer, save that a sense that the totality transcends space-time forever haunts us. But we do, on the analog of Kant's famous and famously obscure 'transcendental deduction', suspect the greater significance behind that 'deduction' of that unknown which transcends the space-time representations of our perceptions, because it connected with a a priori categories that are a prerequisite of those representations. Similar, and more complex deliberations of this type lead us to see the ambiguity of our causal understanding applied to ourselves, indeed to our historical action, hence evolution, and this leads to the issue of our free will, a belief about which we cannot either do with or without as an assumption of our action, particularly our ethical action. 

In our 'evolutionary model' however we have seen, without directly invoking free will, that we have a direct indication of the 'evolution of freedom in some fashion or meaningful sense of freedom short of free will', that is, in terms of 'degrees of freedom' stretching between passivity to less passivity, as relative degrees of free action. 

We might close with a citation of Kant's Third Antinomy to note the way that we have found direct evidence in the history/evolution sphere itself of the relevance of this thinking to the issue of a hidden or barely visible macro factor in the evolution of man. That is we can, and in the text of World History And The Eonic Effect the evidence is directly outlined, find not only theoretically, but in practice the analog micro/macro factors corresponding to the thesis and antithesis of Kant's famous antinomy, their conjunction as a double process on two levels neatly reconciling the staging of the contradiction that Kant finds at the heart of our thinking. 

Kant’s Third Antinomy The crux of the contradiction pervading evolutionary and ethical ideas is posed in the classic ‘Dialectic ’ of Kant’s first Critique. “Causality according to laws of nature is not the only kind of causality from which the phenomenon of the world can be derived. It is necessary, in order to explain them, to assume a causality through freedom.” Its antithesis is: “There is no freedom: everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.”

 Many details of this analysis can be pursued in the text indicated, but we should note that this analysis suddenly restricted its consideration to human evolution, leaving the question of evolution in general up in the air. It would not be hard to generalize this kind of model to any stage of evolution, but in the absence of corresponding evidence it would only be an exercise in abstractions. The effect of this analysis is to find an 'evolution of some kind' in our immediate historical vicinity, leaving us to be wary of universal generalizations about all times and places. We need to proceed with caution beyond the bare inference of evolution in deep time to any final conclusion about its mechanism, since we can see that in our immediate case the task of correctly assessing evolution is hard enough. It would be cinch to modify this model to assess, say, the origin of life, or the Cambrian, but our use of it has been rendered significant because it matched a set of historical facts visible to us at short range. The corresponding data for earlier periods of evolution is so far lacking. But we should be mindful that a 'capsule' of evolutionary understanding over a restricted interval is sufficient for us to take the fact of evolution into account in our own case, at least, and then we can proceed by approximation to a greater sense of our position in relation to the mystery of evolution, mindful also that the the dynamic of evolution is partially veiled in the phenomenal/noumenal boundary, the undoubted reason we precipitate metaphysical dialectic in the attempt to reach past the limits of observation, the undoubted source of 'one long argument'.