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This
approach immediately creates two levels, hence two ‘evolutions’ really. A
large-scale process, and the reaction to that in between, the
‘self-evolution’ in the middle, or medieval periods. Or else there is an
'evolution' of the cultures, the 'streams' that cross the boundaries of the
eonic intervals, in the larger sequence. Thus we have multiple perspectives on
evolution. We thus have a good reason to define 'eonic evolution' for one part
only of our total picture of civilization. To see this, consider the Axial Age.
Does our 'evolution' do this in detail, is it all determined. Clearly not. It
seems more like an improvised play. All the action of the actors is their
rendition. Yet there is an overall logic to the sequence of events. These two
levels are crucial for dealing with such a complex phenomenon. We see that we
must be careful to distinguish these different aspects, and our emerging model
will be tailor made for this purpose. In fact, not only is our 'eonic evolution'
correlated with just a part of the whole, it seems to consist of a minimum
needed to get the job done. It amounts to saying that we are dealing with a
mixed 'causality/freedom' system, one in which the 'causality' part is quite
different from physics causality, and in which the freedom part operates on some
prior condition of consciousness able to jump to higher octaves of creative
action.
Although
this eonic evolution seems to be limited in its action, it does nonetheless
express what can only be the ‘main event’, so to speak, with respect to
(historical) evolution. State formation, religion, the emergence of science,
art, philosophy, and more, come under its action. A phenomenon on this scale is
the only candidate for a theory about ‘macroevolution’ since it dwarfs all
other processes in its comprehensive scope. No second candidate could exist
distinct from this process. Such a statement must remain controversial, however,
because of the way the 'eonic mainline' gives preference, at first sight, to a
series of selected transition areas. These become the local sources for a
greater whole. Problems arise from this, but that's what the facts show. The
Israelites produce the source materials for monotheism, and this gives the
Judaic stream a distinct place in the greater unfolding of the monotheistic
religions.
In
general, subprocesses, like economic evolution, as we will see, interact in a
distinct way and are no exception to our statements about eonic evolution. Note
this point: state formation, religion formation, the greatest art, the
foundations of all the major transitions, much else, all these are directly
correlated, although not exclusively so, with our eonic sequence. This
seems to downgrade the untouched greater history not part of the eonic sequence.
Not so. It is the mideonic periods in which the 'test of evolution' must occur,
where the degree of autonomy is confronted with its independence from evolution,
as it enters history. But, it must be admitted, the first stages of mideonic
free action show alarming tendencies toward chaos.
Thus
we also note another clue, net innovation, between the transitions, also
seems to be increasing with time, for example. So, while our eonic sequence, has
no monopoly here, it nonetheless leaves us with an unsettling picture, were we
to subtract the advances correlated with our series of transitions. The
system is evolving one way, and in the process turning into something else.
History is emerging from evolution, so to speak.
Darwinists
distinguish this term ‘macroevolution’ from ‘microevolution’ and then
often state that the micro aspect, natural selection, can explain, or explain
away, the macro. We have cautioned against this. Microevolution might be the
degree of ethical self-consciousness brought to bear on mideonic situations. To
suggest the whole game was done by natural selection leaves us in the lurch. Why
bother with qualitative refinements? Dog eat dog then, it's 'evolution'. This
fallacy has proven costly in the legacy of Social Darwinism.
Macroevolution
is also associated with the actual process of speciation. Here Darwinists have a
point. And here again, at least with man, there is no clear proof in the
evidence that Darwinian microevolution is sufficient for this. And just at the
tail end of what we call the ‘descent of man’, better, the ‘descent of
humans’, we find this macro aspect to the very late development of
civilization. What are we to suspect of earlier man? Anything operating on the
scale of the eonic pattern must claim some reckoning. One problem here is the
failure to define ‘man’, with a serious question mark: can modern man
actually claim, objectively, the ability to make such a definition? Furthermore,
in the absence of a definition we are in no position to state that man’s
‘evolution’ is complete. Maybe the eonic evolution of civilization is just
the next grade in school, from which man might graduate? We had thought
that Darwinian evolution had created free men left to their devices at the
threshold of history, thence to create higher civilization in an evolved
autonomy. Yet now we see that at each stage an invisible driver is processing
feedback as it were, without which man’s self-development would evidently have
begun to drift or idle, witness the equilibrium of medievalizing sluggishness
that overtakes the intervals between our transitions. The question of the
‘freedom to self-evolve in history’ has become ambiguous. We must, however,
suspect that we have, for better or worse, reached a terminal point in eonic
evolution. More on that later, but it would be hard for eonic evolution to
continue once we begin to notice it. This point will prove significant, by way
of conclusion.
And
one aspect of this must be the unsettling question we must pose to ourselves:
what is the relation of this ‘evolution’ to our present? As we will see this
is the crux of the whole problem, and the paradox created by bringing
‘evolution’ into our present will force us to redefine our terms
comprehensively. But we can hardly claim a macroevolution is operating in our
present. Where is it? How does it effect our choices? We will have
to carefully address this issue. All we can say is that, by our definition,
still unfixed, our recent past shows an evolutionary transition. We
exited the last transition, and then, as eonic observers, noticed the fact of
'evolution of some kind'. To make this clear, since our previous cases, the
Axial Age, for example, show an interval that rapidly came to a close, we must
suspect the same for the modern transition. We cam easily spot the crucial
interval, to conclude that this is indeed the case. It must have come to a
close, it did come to a close, leaving us outside of it, in order to observe it
at all. We call that the divide, and try to suggest later this occurs ca.1800, a
moment of great significance for modernity.
Therefore
we are, strangely, outside of this process, at least for the moment. This at
first peculiar thinking will actually prove to be the breakthrough to the right
approach to the whole question, at least for human evolution.
It
would seem that what we are discussing is ‘cultural evolution’ in some form,
and that no conflict should arise with statements about biological evolution. It
is certainly the case that we have no evidence of any genetic component to our
‘eonic evolution’, although we have not looked carefully for it, and it
would seem justified up to a point to consider that man as man, genetically
speaking, once reached a plateau where his ‘nature’ is fixed, at least to
some degree. But a problem has arisen here, and we can see that the biological
claims of Darwinists are going to collide with what we see in history and wish
to call evolution of some other kind, at first sight purely cultural. First, and
foremost, we can see that, with respect to history, the claims of natural
selection are going to fail.
We
can see the one thing theories of natural selection are designed to rule out,
discontinuous episodes of rapid ‘evolution’ that operate over the long
range, and that can do a kind of ‘end run’ around the sluggish competition
of winners and losers. We will see that, on the average, the winners, by winning
out, tend to create rigid structures that are incapable of innovation. Something
new and different appears from a different source, often in the frontier areas
of previous histories. We have definite counterevidence here, complete
with a substitute evolutionary driver, albeit in such a fragmentary glimpse that
we are left to wonder about the earlier manifestations of such a prodigious
force.
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