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We can bring all our ideas together in a short summary of our
eonic model, which dissolves into the background as it turns into an outline of
history, starting in the next section, and the appendix. If the model seems
complex, keep in mind that it is designed so that theory will be segregated from
action. But before doing that we can bring in one last idea, the idea of a sort
of floating ‘fourth turning point’, and can speak of ‘general TP4
exceptions’. Later we will
connect this to questions of ideology, especially the ideology involved in
saying that TP3 is a major turning point. Our model is very powerful and summons
up a classic distinction: freedom in the eonic system, and freedom from the
eonic system. We fulfill the eonic sequence, and then we move out of it. System
action yields to free action, which must self-evolve into Freedom.
TP4
exceptions Our eonic history is about what we see in the past. At all points
the human agents were free to act in any way, and yet we see the system sets an
overall direction. As the eonic sequence shuts down those agents are again free
to act in any way, including the possibility of producing actions scripts that
will undo TP3. In fact we are seeing that already. Since we have made no
predictions, not even that anyone should agree with the direction (s) set by our
system. We can see however that TP3, which is now something more than the
splitting outcomes of rival ideologies, would be hard to undo! The real problem
is the phenomenon we see in antiquity after the Axial interval, a slow but
steady collapse of general advance. A great many ‘general TP4 exceptions’
attempted to wrest control of history and the future in that mideonic period.
Nothing in our formulation preempts the possibility of a
special kind of TP4 exception: setting up a plan of action that will
contradict/undo TP3 by creating a new ‘turning point’ out of synch with the
eonic sequence, thus proving it false! In fact, this possibility goes a long way
toward explaining much reactive anti-modernism, postmodern critique of the
Enlightenment, and much else. And it shows that our affirmation of the eonic
sequence contains an ideological element. This however is no objection to our
basis thesis which is not, to repeat, a set of statements about historical laws,
but a set of observations about the relationship, in the past, between an
‘eonic system action’ and ‘free action’. These issues should come home
to roost at the end of our model making, but for the moment we can say that
undoing TP3 would likely prove very difficult, the result being instant chaotic
decline. Consider the rapid fall off after the Axial interval. We should do
better to preserve the gains of eonic evolution! Just at that point we realize
our difficulty in even defining the ‘modernity’ we associate with TP3. We
must graduate to the immense task of realizing our model as what it also is: a
simple periodization map turning into a world history chronicle.
From evolution to history The way we
have set up our model, in some fashion, automatically answers all these
objections. Our task is not reactive anti-modernism, but a genuine
self-consciousness that can both realize and transcend the eonic sequence, as we
‘exit evolution into history’. That, however, is not so simple.
Thus there is a strange solidity to our thinking: we have
built in a principle of falsification! But let us proceed to recapitulate our
basic ideas. The data of the eonic effect, with its shades and hues brought out
by the accompanying eonic model (it's like a high-contrast effect given to a
photograph), gives us a complete but high-level snapshot of a strange new
entity, the 'eonic evolution of civilization'. To summarize our terms again: We
have connected the ideas of evolution and history, bypassed the problem with
laws of history. We then created a simple model, and connected this with a key
theme of the philosophy of history. This model is simply a matrix of
periodization, in which we keep a careful distinction of 'system' and 'free
activity'. The slow alternation of the two creates the eonic effect. Note
that ‘theories’ and models are part of the output of our system.
Observers, embedded agents What is
our status as observers of this system? We have already answered this. We have a
model that carefully defines ‘theory’, ours at least, in the present, and
which preempts the Oedipus effect
by switching off after the close of our pattern, so that ‘theory’ applies
only to the past, looking backwards. Theory is a codependent evolute in the
eonic sequence. The outcome of the transitions are a series of action scripts,
i.e. potential domains of 'action realizations' on eonic themes, sequentially
dependent on the 'eonic emergents'.
The question of the observer is crucial since such observers chameleon the
ideological emergents of their own transitions, e.g. the redactors of the Old
Testament, expressed the output of the system as 'action scripts'. We would like
to replace all these observers with a scientific eonic observer, but that is not
so simple, since science has no categories for this kind of analysis, as yet. However,
to be an eonic observer requires only basic operations, e.g. periodization, and
can be done independently of the ideological content of the eonic sequence
(maybe).
Let
us recall our already defined terms. Note that our frequency series shows the
eonic sequence, and that in between we have the mideonic periods which show a
series of oikoumenes created by diffusion.
Stream and sequence We have
created two levels to our model, and we can consider the history of a particular
culture the stream aspect, and the intersection of that with the larger
evolutionary process the sequence aspect.
Consider
the example of Greece. The stream of Greek history is one thing, and proceeds as
the tale of a culture or cultural complex over many millennia. But its
intersection with the 'eonic sequence' produces a transition in a larger
process. This is the characteristic Axial Greek period, issuing from the Dark
Ages into the so-called Archaic, then Classical periods. This is actually a very
efficient way to 'evolve' a whole through an isolated series of parts.
Diffusion
and oikoumenes Each transition produces a diffusion field leading to a new
oikoumene. The Hellenistic is one classic example and appears almost immediately
in the wake of our Greek Axial transition.
Sequential dependency This process creates a broader rubric than causality.
Each successive culture in the diffusion field shows a kind of loose
determination created by the transition.
The
reason for this is the inability of the successors to match the creative
intensity of the transitional period. People begin to look backwards and form a
tradition based on the transition. Many of the seminal innovations are in fact
lost as time goes on. Greek democracy fails to endure, or example. The world of
empire takes over. The great flowering of Greek tragedy simply stops immediately
at the end of the fifth century. To understand sequential dependency consider
this case of tragic drama. To overcome this dependency effect we would have to
be able to produce tragic dramas 'on demand' as it were! Clearly in this one
case we are still the downfield sequence unable to freely 'transcend history'.
This
approach allows us to deal in a useful way with directionality without the
confusions of teleology. This model is really about two levels, and we see the
stream level and the level of the eonic sequence. These two levels are braided
together and this matches the dynamic driving 'eonic evolution'.
Discrete-continuous models The
type of model we use is a so-called discrete-continuous model because we see a
discrete series of turning points overlaid on a continuous pattern of world
history.
The switched off present The
elegance of a discrete-continuous model where the 'system' takes the discrete
series aspect, and 'free action' the continuous history aspect, is the way the
character of the system changes as we enter our present. Note that we are
outside the 'eonic series' and have been executives of the output of the system.
Nothing
could be simpler than this approach to modeling: We change our mental software
in a very simple way and the data makes sense! We simply take our three turning
points and turn them into discrete transitions three centuries in length in an
eonic sequence overlaid on our second universal history, TP1, 2, 3 become:
Transition
1: birth of civilization -3300 to -3000
Transition 2: Axial interval -900 to -600
Transition 3: rise of the modern 1500 to 1800
Isn't
this a bit artificial? Yes, it is, or seems so at first, but it doesn't
really matter since a rough match is quite sufficient. These transitions create
a fishnet, and only approximate an unknown functionality, but undoubtedly map
out statistical regions.
Eonic
emergents, relative transforms Our observations are based on the way stream
phenomena show 'relative transforms' as they become 'eonic emergents'. The Axial
transformation of 'monotheism' is a 'relative transform' (it existed before) and
by definition thus an 'eonic emergent'.
Note that we cannot define the 'essence of a transition', e.g. modernity, since
each one is a spectrum of eonic emergents forming no simple philosophical unity.
Approximations, e.g. 'Scientific modernism' or 'Enlightenment rationality'
are only approximate up to a point.
'System action'/'free action' The question of causality and freedom yields to
'system action' and 'free action', which in the eonic sequence are also called 'eonic
determination' and 'free action'. Evolution yields to history, as the degree of
freedom increase, Freedom growing out of 'free action'.
Self-consciousness The medium of action, and emerging freedom, is
self-consciousness. This is also the medium of eonic determination. True freedom
lies beyond and outside of eonic determination, which happens in the mideonic
periods or at the end of the eonic sequence.
These terms allow us to efficiently describe the eonic system in general terms
beyond the actual content.
There is nothing dogmatic or even fully derived in this
matrix. It simply works if we take it that way. It is like the schedule in a
school. The timing of classes is given, system action, but the content is 'free
action'. Later we will consider foundationalist questions and ask what
foundation we can give to this model. One approach that avoids metaphysical
foundationalism to adopt a 'circular epistemology' as explored by such figures
as Hegel. IF we set up a model, however arbitrarily, then as we enter into its
implications we see in practice its basis in reality: there is an extraordinary
match to the data. More generally we explore a theory of the evidence, short of
a closed depiction of mechanism, which is always beyond observation, by
definition, for reasons we will see. But as an approximation it
encompasses the statistical regions of innovation that form the cluster effect
of our pattern. Too many pieces of a puzzle fall into place for the model
to be too far off the mark.
Relative
beginnings The nice thing about this model is that we can start anywhere. We
have, as yet, no absolute beginning to our series, although we proposed a
frequency hypothesis extending it backwards. But that hypothesis is not
necessary for the use of what we have. In fact, we suspect that our
transitions create a net increase in complexity, information, and
self-organization in a way that is not causally sequential with its antecedent
periods.
End
of Sequence? Note that we are outside the last transition and that this
switches off in our past: our current action may or may not express the
aggregate directionality shown, which is highly complex in any case, comprising
multiple parallel streams. Thus the teleology, if any, inferable from the
continuation of TP3, may be quite different from that of the overall sequence.
We are left with a question, have we reached the end of the sequence?
Modern unidirectionality? The puzzle of the Axial Age synchrony is
matched by the mirror image puzzle of the absence of geographical synchrony in
the modern transition, leading to endless confusion about a Eurocentric Western
civilization. But as we enter intensive globalization, the realization that the
modern transition, with its frontier focus, is a transient interval in a greater
eonic sequence resolves many paradoxes at one stroke. An Axial phenomenon in a
shrinking world would have proved disastrous, and the transcultural latency of
modernist universalism gives a rubric for an eonic first: a globalized oikoumene.
Economic cycles It is important to see that we have transcended the
economic interpretation of history. But our method, even as we bypass the
economic interpretation of history, resembles the stance of economists studying
economic cycles. Economists produce theories about cycles in the past, looking
backwards, and their model switches off in the present, and they have ‘free
action’ in this present (i.e. the ability to modify the cycles, maybe).
Predictions may still be possible, but free action can change any such
prediction, at least theoretically.
Note: Economic evolution? An essential issue is to see that while the
question of economic systems is braided with this pattern, the two are not the
same. Look at TP2. Multiple eonic emergents cluster there that are not economic
by category. We can’t use economic explanations for the sudden appearance of
world religions, philosophies in a spectrum, and everything else, including
flowerings of art.
We
have produced an ‘idea for universal history’, and it is important to
understand it, since such histories are open to challenge on various grounds,
among them ethnocentrism. It seems as if the modern transition is a form of
Eurocentrism, but in fact we have bypassed that completely, at least in
principle. The rise of modernity takes place in a local frontier area in a phase
of transition, and begins to globalize almost immediately thereafter. The
question of ‘Western Civilization’ never arises.
In
the same vein, nothing in our model excludes the independent emergence of
civilization in multiple areas. Our eonic series shows a predominance of effect,
but has no monopoly on invention. Quite the contrary, we see that our eonic
sequence tends to 'sift' the prior achievements of the cultures in its direct
path and amplify them for 'general distribution'. The greater totality of human
cultures has many latent resources inherited from the Paleolithic, and our eonic
sequence performs but a selection of cultural factors from this totality. There
is hardly another explanation for the way it seems to contradict itself, as it
spawns two world religions in parallel, the atheist Buddhism, and the
monotheistic proto-Judaism. In each case the prior stream was there, but as they
intersect with the eonic sequence the latent cultural potential self-organizes
into vehicles useful to the dominant theme of globalization.
Thus,
there is nothing in our account to preempt the possibility of the independent
emergence of civilization in the New World. And in fact, without a trace of
prejudice against this magnificent zone of human cultural achievement, the fact
must be admitted that these civilizations are a bit anemic and sluggish compared
with the high-octane fast-paced advance occurring in the Eurasian field. We
suspect that we see an example of what the independent evolution of culture
without a macro driver would be like. The Eurasian landmass, with a center of
gravity, or rather, diffusion, in the Middle East is clearly a more efficiently
compact field of operation, giving a small investment in a series of hotspots or
transitions a big payoff in the rapid spread of civilization to its far corners.
Notwithstanding this view of the New World civilizations we nonetheless suspect
a strong element of diffusion is at work in the emergence of the Olmec, Mayan,
and other New World cultures, a question with a considerable controversy. More
on this issue later.
Let
us note in this context that we have produced an 'idea for a universal history'
and this produces in reality two universal histories.
Two Universal Histories Attempts
to produce universal histories suffer from the selectivity of their focus. Our
approach has a built in failsafe: even as follow an eonic mainline we encounter
the set of cultural streams that crosses the boundary of the sequence. And the
totality beyond that is as much our real subject as the selective mainline of
advance. We thus have two, or multiple universal histories, encompassing the
totality of human culture.
This raises issues that are still incompletely realized
aspects of world history. We don't know but we can only assume that we have
exited the eonic sequence in the final stage of the 'evolution of freedom'. We
have no secure grounds for claiming to be outside of the eonic sequence. After
the Axial Age, most of what is necessary for the conduct of civilization was
present, yet the system collapsed and went into mideonic decline. Science, and
democracy virtually died out. Despite many myths of a future cyclical
coming age the eonic system was able to restage an unexpected system return. But
as we observe the eonic effect we suspect its future return would collide with
anticipation. We must suspect the eonic series terminates as we become aware of
it. Expectation of future return created hopeless confusion in previous eras,
the myths of the last times being examples. Hegel's version, a myth of another
kind, might help to stabilize such extravagance. This end of eonic
sequence is a true beginning, the birth of true history, but under dangerous
conditions, since we have to ability to conduct cultural change on the scale of
the eonic effect. So, we must learn.
That’s it. Our model is simply a grid on
the surface of a planet, showing a sequence of transitions between different
regions, sometimes with parallel connections.
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